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DEC -4 1979

IN THE

SUPR~ME

COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

TYPOGRAPHICAL CORRECTIONS

THO!otAS WYMAN BERG,

Case No. 16548

Defendant and Appellant,

Appellant submits the following typographical corrections
to appellants brief:
Cover page:

"noting" should read: nothing

Page 2, line 3:

"decisions reversed" should read: decision is
reversed

Page 2, line 9:

"noting" should read: nothing

Page 3, line 17:

"no" should read: not

Page 3, line 19:

"tolk" should read: told

Page 4, line 13:

"v.2d" should read: U.2d

Page 5, line 18:

"prohibitations" should read: prohibitions

Page 5, line 23:

"(1978)" should read:

(1798)

_-V<'

Dated this

ED\~ARD

K.

~)

day of December, 1979.
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Attorney for the Appellant
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IN THE SUPREME OXJRT OF 'IRE S'I2\TE OF UTAH

STATE OF urAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPEr..LAN1'

vs.

Case No. 16548

THOW\S WYMAN BERG I

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant-appellant appeals from his conviction by the Honorable
George E. Ballif, Fourth District Judge, sitting with::>ut jury, of the offense
of distribution of a controlled substance where nothing for value was exchanged.

He further appeals from the Court's failure to find that the State's

principal witness against him was his accarrplice and fran the Court's failure
to require corroboration of the ac=rplices test:im:Jny.
DISPOSTIION IN THE LOWER COURI'
Appellant was found guilty on May 25, 1979 by the Honorable George
E. Ballif of a violation of Section 58-37-8 (1) A (c), Utah Code Annotated
(1953), distributing a controlled substance, marijuana, where nothing for
value was exchanged.
RELIEF SOUGHT 00 APPEAL

Appellant seeks a reversal of the ~ower Court's decision that
ti1e State's principal witness against him was not his accanplice and that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in any event her test.inony need not have been corroborated because of the
changes made in Section 77-31-18, U.C.A. (1953) by the 1978 legislature,
In the event that the lower Court' s decisions reversed, appellant requests

that the charges against him be dismissed because the evidence against him
was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
STATEMENI' OF FOCTS
On January 16, 1979, appellant was charged by cOIIplaint with having .

ccmnitted the offense of distribution of a controlled substance, rrarijuana,
where noting of value was exchanged.

Tre offense was alleged to have taken

place oil Novenber 21, 1978 (Record-ll).

On infonration charging that offense
!

was subsequently filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court (R-ll).

On

May 8, 1979, former Section 77-31-18 (all statutory citations are to Utah
Code Armotated tm.less otherwise noted) was repealed and a new section 77-31-E
took effect.

The new section p=vides that, " (a) conviction may be had on

the tmcorroborated test.inony of an acCOIIplice."

On May 24, 1979, appellant's:

trial was held before the Honorable George E. Ballif.

The appellant waived

his right to a jury trial, stipulated to the admission of certain evidence,
and the State proceeded to call three witnesses.
The first witness was one Jill Hales.

Ms. Hales testified that sh:

knew the defendant and that she had rret with him in his hare on the m::>rning

of November 21, 1978 to acquire sorre "stuff" for a friend (T-14).
was accOIIpanied by a Teri Barney.

Ms. Hales

Ms. Hales testified that she and the

appellant had a conversation out of the presence of Ms. Barney that rroming,
(T-15).

The appellant said, "I have got this for you," (T-16), indicating

a potmd of marijuana "sitting in the living r=m."

Ms. Hales said she put

the rrarijuana in her purse and said she would bring m::>ney back later, but no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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definite arrangerrents for paynent were made ('1'-17).
ever made.

No payment was in fact

Ms. Hales then stated that pursuant to a pre-arranged plan with

a Craig Wiseman, she drove to a local restaurant and put the marijuana in
Wiseman 1 s car (T-18) .

Teri Barney acconpanied her.

for the marijuana ('1'-19).

was arrested (T-20).

Wisem:m then paid Hales

Upon leaving the restaurant parking lot, Hales

Hales was told by the officers at the police station

that she had the ch:>ice to either becCI!e a paid tmdercover narcotics informant
or else she VIOuld go to prison and lose custody of her little girl (T-22,
33-35, 39).

She opted to becCI!e an informant and charges were in fact dropped

against her pursuant to a grant of inmunity she received in exchange for her
testirrr::>ny in this case, (T-30) •

She was wired with an electronic listening

device and returned to the appellant 1 S h::tre, where she thought that the
appellant may have asked her i f the police had got "it" ('1'-23).

No tape or

transcript of their conversation was ever introduced into evidence.
The State 1 s second witness was Teri Barney, the wanan wh:J had accom-

panied Hales to the appellant 1 s hCile and then to the Wisem:m car.

She

testified that she had no heard any conversation between the appellant and
Hales on November 21, 1978 ('1'-45).

She said that she and Hales left the Berg

ho11E in her car and Hales asked her to drive by the restaurant (T-46).

When

they arrived there, Hales tock a plastic package out of her purse which Barney
believed to be marijuana.

No one ever tolk her i f it was or not ('1'-47).

Ms.

1

Barney did not know i f Hales had taken the purse into the appellant s h:>!1E,
she did not know how long the marijuana had been in the purse, Hales never
opened the purse and showed her the contents before or after they went to
the appellant 1 s hollE, and they in fact never even discussed what sre had in
the purse (T-50), or why they were going to the restaurant (T-51).

Hales then

took the plastic package, wrapped it in a windbreaker, and put the wrapped
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package in Wisern:m 's car (T-48) •
The State's final witness was Craig Wisern:m.

he had asked Hales to get him "a potmd," (T-54).

Wisern:m testified that

He also said that he had

'I

i

seen Hales arrive at the restaurant and had paid her a sum of rroney (T-56).

Wiseman later found the marijuana in the back seat of the car (T-57).
The appellant erose to rest witmut presenting any testirrony.

He

argued that Hales was an accomplice and as such her testirrony required corr-

aboration.

Appellant contended that co=ooration was absent or insufficient'

and thus he smuld have been fotmd not guilty.

The Court took the matter

under advisemmt (T-63-79)
On May 25, 1979 the Court issued a rrerrorandum decision finding the

appellant guilty, (R-21-23).

The Court based its decision on State v. Kasai,

27 v.2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972) and State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d 1134 (Utah l9i
It also based its decision on the enactrrent of House Bill 143, now Section
77-31-18, providing that a conviction may be had on the tmco=ooorated testirrony of an accomplice, (R-23)
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE APPLICATICN OF THE NEW SB:TICN 77-31-18 TO THIS CASE WAS
crnTRARY TO THE EX POST FACIO PROVISICNS OF THE STATE AND

FEDERAL CCNSTITUTICNS AND CCNTRARY TO U'I1IH LAW.
If this Court concludes that the lower Court was correct in applying

to this case the version of Section 77-31-18 which took effect on M2:t 8, 1979,
it need not reach the issues of whether or not the witness Hales was an aceomplice of the appellant or whether her testirrony was corrooorated because
such issues would be superfluous.

The new Section now permits the conviction

of a defendant on the tmcorrooorated testirrony of an accanplice.

!:CMeJer,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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action.

The application of the new statute was prohiliited by the State and

Federal Constitutions as well as State law.
The events which gave rise to the proceedings against the appellant
were alleged to have occurred on Novenber 21, 1978.

On that day, and when

the information was filed in January, 1979, the accatplice statute provided,
" A conviction shall not be had on the testirron.y of an
aceatplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence
which in itself and without the aid of the testincny of
the accorrplice tends to connect the defendant with the
comnission of the offense; and the co=oboration shall
not be sufficient, if it rrerely shows the comnission of
the offense or the ciretml.Stances thereof."
On

May 24,1979, the case went. to trial.

The lower court, in finding the

appellant guilty, applied the accarplice statute which had taken effect 16
days earlier, providing that," a conviction rray be had on the uncorroborated
testi.Irony of an accomplice," Section 77-31-18.

The application of the new

Section violated constitutional restraints on ex post facto laws.
The constitutional prohiliitations of ex post facto laws are contained
in Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 18 of the Utah Constitution.

The forrrer states, "no state shall •..

pass any . . . ex post facto law," while the latter ccmnands that, " no ... ex
post facto law ... shall be passed."

The United States Suprerre Court, in

Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1978), gave the term "ex post facto law" a
definition which has endured nearly 200 years,
" 1st, every law that nakes an action done before the
passing of the law; and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes su:::h action. 2nd, every law
that advocates a cr.:.rre, or nakes it greater than it was
when cormlitted. 3d, every law that changes the punishrrent, and inflicts a greater punishrralt, than the
law annexed to t.re crirre when corrrnitted. 4th, every
law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony, than the law
required at the tine cf the corrrnission of the offense
in order to convict the offender. All these and
slinilar laws, are r.Bnifestly in just and oppressive,"
Sponsored
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The Court's explanation in calder v. Bull was refined in Hopt v.

Utah, 110

u.s.

574 (1883).

Hopt was a homicide case.

At the tine of the

hanicide, the Utah Territory had a law which forbade testinony by convicted
felons.

After the indictnent, but prior to the trial, the legislature

repealed the law.

Subsequently I the appellant was convicted.

Ii

His conviction

in part rested upon the testinony of a convicted felon who would not have

bee.~

pez:mi.tted to testify under the law in effect at the tine the offense was
ccmni.tted.

I

The appellant argued that permitting the convicted felon to testir,l

against him anounted to an ex post facto application of law.

The Court re-

J

jected his contention, stating, " Statutes which sirrply enlarge the class of
persons wh:> may be corrpetent to testify in criminal cases are not ex pest factc
in their application to prosecutions for crilres crnmitted prior to their

passage; for they do not . • . alter the degree, or lessen the anount or rreasure,
of the proof ·which was made necessary to conviction when the crilre was comnitte)
Id, 110

u.s.

574, 589.

In contrast, the Court warned, "Any statutory alter-

ation of the legal rules of evidence which would authorize conviction upon
less proof, in anount or degree, than was required when the offence was
conmitted, might, in respect of that offence, be obnoxious to the constitutiolli,
inhibition utXJn ex post facto laws, " Id., 110 U.S. 574,590.
In the present case, the change in the accarrplice statute on M3.y 8,
did not rrerely, "enlarge the class of persons who may be carrpetent to testify,
Hopt v. Uta1-!, supra.
the old statute.

Accarrplices have always been canpetent witnesses \D'lder

Instead, the change in the statute authorized "conviction

upon less proof, in arrount or degree, than was required when the offence was
ccmnitted," Id.

Under the law in effect at the tiiTe of the offense, the
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acCO!!Plice 's testirrony required corroboration, while under the new law it did
not.

Thus, under the new law, the defendant could be convicted under less

proof, and to apply the new law -would be to apply an ex post facto law.
This was the conclusion of the Alabama Suprerre Court over 100 years
ago when presented with precisely the same issue as is before this Court.
In Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32,

(1866), the defendant was indicted for gambling

In 1863, the Alabama Legislature passed a law providing that an

in 1860.

accomplice's testim::lny need not be corroborated in misdeneanor cases, such
as gambling.

After the law was enacted the defendant was convicted solely

on the testim::lny of an accarplice.

The Alabama Suprene Court reversed the

conviction, mlding that to give the new statute a retroactive effect "-would
rrade it an ex post facto law, " 40 Ala. 32, 35.

The Court stated that the ·

uncorroborated testim:lny of an acconplice was, " ••• less than, if not different
from, that required by law at the tine the offense is alleged to have been
corrmi tted.

If • . • the conviction on the sole testirrony of an aoconplice,

is not less evidence than that required at the tine of the alleged catmission
of the offense .•. it is difficult for rre to conceive what is rreant by the
rule laid down in Calder v. Bull, "

40 Ala. 32, 36-37.

While the precise issue has never arisen in this State, ~le reason
exists to suggest that this COurt should follow the conclusion reached in
Alabama.

Section 68-3-5 states, "The repeal of a statute does not ••• affect

any right which has accrued . . . or any action or proceeding conrrenced under
or by virtue of the statute repealed."

The repeal of the old acconplice

statute could thus not affect the appellants "right"to have acconplice testilrony corroborated because the action was "conrrenced under" that statute.
Its repeal could not affect the pending action.

The Utah Suprene Court

'M:luld Sponsored
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, Services
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Law State
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Court observed,

" • • • the law sh:mld not be changed sirrq?ly because of the
will or desire of judges as to what the law is or ought to
be. Much less so, srould it be so changed during the
course of a particular pr=eeding to have a retroactive
effect thereon . • • If there is to be such a change in the
law .•• it seems that it srould have only prospective
effect and that fairness and good conscience require
that it srould not be applied retroactively to adversely
affect rights as they existed at the tirre a particular
controversy arose, " 56 9 P. 2d 1100 , 110 2 .
It is apparent that the Court below erred when it failed to apply tre
old accomplice statute and require corroboration of the Hales testirtony.
However, even under the old statute, corroboration v.Duld not be required if
Hales was not an accrnrplice.
POlNT II

THE STI\.'IE' S PR.IN:IPAL WITNESS, HALES, WAS AN ACCOMPLICE.

The principal witness against the appellant was Jill Hales.

She

rrerits that designation because hers was the only testirtony to connect him
with the coornission of an offense.

If she were not an accomplice her test-

i."YDny alone might be sufficient to sustain a conviction.

However, because

she was an accorrplice her test:irrony should have been corrol:orated.
An "accorrplice" has been variously defined as "one who is or could

be charged as a principal with the defendant on trial, i.e. one who is liable

to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on
trial," State v. Kasai, 27 U.2d. 326, 327, 495 P.2d. 1265, 1266 (1972}; or
"one woo participates in a crirre in such a way that he could be tried and
charged for the same offense,"

State v. Cornish, 560 P.2d. 1134 (Utah 1977).

Under Utah law, one can be "charged as a principal"

when he or she, "acting

with the rrental state required for the cc::mnission of an offense ... solicits,
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requests, corrrnands, encourages, or intentionally aid another person to
engage in =nduct which constitutes an offense ... , "

Section 76-2-202.

A superficial examination of State v. Kasai, supra, might lead the
Court to conclude that Hales was rot an accanplice of the appellant.
Court should not make that mistake.

The

Kasai said, "The purchaser of nar=tics

is not an accanplice of the seller, as the offense of the purchaser is
"possession" and not "selling" and, therefore the conviction of a defendant
nay be founded on the purchaser's unco=borated testirrony,"
1266.

495 P.2d 1265,

This phrase has no great significance for the present appeal because

it is obsolete and rray have only been e=neous or unnecessary dictum.
Unlike Kasai,

the present case does not involve a "sale" or a

"purchase" but rather a distribution without value.

The nental state for that

offense required the appellant to act "knowingly and intentionally."

Hales,

acting with the sarre mental state, "solicited, requested, and en=uraged" the
appellant to ccmnit the offense by calling him and asking him to procure
narijuana for her friend and then going to his hc.ue to obtain it.

She even

"intentionally aided" him to ccmnit the offense by actually accanplishing
the distribution element of the offense rerself when she walked over to where
the rrarijuana lay and picked it up.

Her actions would permit her to be

charged as a principal under Section 76-2-202.

She would also be an accatplice,

because an "a=anplice" is "a person wro could be charged as a principal
with the defendant on trial,"

State v. Davie, 121 u. 184, 240 P.2d 263 (1952) ·

Section 76-2-202, which broadened the definition of those wro =uld be charged
as principals, took effect the year after the Kasai decision and rrade such
narrcw concepts as "buyer" and "seller" obsolete.
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Kasai may also have been wrongly decided.

Appellant suggests that

the reason the buyer was held not to be an accarplice of the seller was not
nerely because he was the "buyer" but rather because he was an undercover
p::>licernan.

As su:h, he could hardly be said to be acting with the rrental

state required for the carrnission of the offense or any offense for that ITB.tter
so as a matter of law he could not be an accanplice.

He was rrerely offering

Mr. Kasai the opportunity to cormnit a cr.i.Ire and considerations of who was

tre

buyer and wro the seller were irrelevant.
Appellant's position is supported by State v. Cornish , 560 P. 2d 1134
(utah 1977) .

There the court was again presented with an undercover !X)lice

officer wro had purchased narcotics.

The defendant again contended that tre

officer was an acconplice whose testirrony required corroboration.

The Court

rejected this argunent, not because the officer was a buyer, but because tre
definition of accorcplice " . . . does not include a person who, without using
indu:errent or persuasion which would anount to entraprrent, rrerely provides an
opportunity for one who is disposed to corrrnit a cr.i.Ire.

fure specifically

applicable here, a person so acting under the direction of a peace officer
in atteirpting to discover violations of law, is not an acconplice," 560 P· 2d
1134, 1136.

Cornish dispensed with the distinction between buyer and seller

drawn in Kasai and recognized the true reason a police buyer is not an accanplice, he does not have the requisite criminal intent.
In the present case, the witness Hales was not a police officer,

agent, or even a buyer.

Acting with the sarre rrental state as alleged tc be

present in the plaintiff, she aided, solicited, and encouraged the appellant
to = i t the offense of distribution of a controlled substance where nothing
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of valu: was exchanged.

Her actions made her liable as a principal tmder

Section 76-2-202 and as su.:::h, she was an accarplice wmse testincny required
corroboration.
POINT III

IW.ES

TEST~

WAS NOI' SUFFICIENTLY CORROBORATED

It has long been the rule that the,

" .•. corroborating evidence

IrnlSt :implicate the defendant in the offense and be consistent with his guilt
and inconsistent with his innocence, and nrust do l!Dre than cast a grave
suspicion upon him, and all of this nrust be witmut the aid of the testincny
of the ac=nplice,"

State v. Erwin, 101 U. 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941).

In

this case there was no sufficient corroboration.
The only

~witnesses

besides Hales were Barney and Wisertan.

Barney testified that she had been with Hales in the Berg hcrre, that she had
not seen the transfer of any marijuana, and that she had no idea where the
marijuana she later saw Hales re=ve fran her purse came from or hew long it
had been in there.

Wisemm never entered or carre near the Berg hc::me and pre-

sented no testillDny on the source of the marijuana.

The State presented no

corrooorative evidence "consistent with Berg's guilt."
CCN::LUSION
The lower Court erred in failing to find that Jill Hales was an
accomplice of the appellant whose testillDny required corroooration.

This

Court smuld reverse that decision and dismiss the charges against the defen-
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dant for the reason that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict

him and a second trial could well violate the double jeopardy clause.
Dated this

:;)

~

day of Deceni:ler, 1979.

I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General, Attorney for

J+l
Respondent, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 on this the _,_
day of December, 1979.
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